Entrepreneurship and Human Capital: Evidence of Patenting Activity from the Academic Sector. by Allen, Stuart D. et al.
Entrepreneurship and Human Capital: Evidence of Patenting Activity from the Academic 
Sector. 
By: Stuart D. Allen, Albert N. Link & Dan T. Rosenbaum 
Allen, S. D., Link, A. N., & Rosenbaum, D. T. (November 01, 2007). Entrepreneurship and 
Human Capital: Evidence of Patenting Activity from the Academic Sector. Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice, 31, 6, 937-951. 
Made available courtesy of Wiley-Blackwell. The definitive version is available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-6520.2007.00207.x/abstract.  
***Reprinted with permission. No further reproduction is authorized without written 
permission from Wiley-Blackwell. This version of the document is not the version of 
record. Figures and/or pictures may be missing from this format of the document. *** 
Abstract: 
This paper presents empirical evidence of the relationship between faculty entrepreneurial 
activity—quantified in terms of the propensity of U.S. university faculty to work directly with 
industry on research activities that lead to patents—and human capital, measured in terms of 
faculty tenure and age. Patenting reflects a unique dimension of faculty entrepreneurship, 
namely, collaborative activity that results in joint intellectual property. We find that faculty with 
tenure are more likely to engage in such activity, thus providing suggestive evidence of an 
externality associated with permanent employment. We also find that older faculty are more 
likely to engage with industry, to a point, holding tenure constant. Tenure and age proxy, 
respectively, what we call the “accumulated advantage” of faculty and their absorptive capacity. 
Because faculty patenting with industry involved both parties, our findings reflect that such 
faculty experience and expertise are important to industry to enter into a patenting relationship. 
Finally, we find that male faculty are more likely to patent with industry than female faculty. 
 entrepreneurship | human capital | patenting | faculty entrepreneurial activity | Keywords:
university faculty | research activities 
Article: 
Introduction 
Since the enactment of the Bayh–Dole Act in 1980, there has been a rapid increase in 
commercial knowledge transfers from U.S. universities to firms through such mechanisms as 
licensing agreements, research joint ventures, and university-based startups. For a history of the 
Bayh–Dole Act, see, for example, Stevens (2004); for an overview of public policy implications 
related to Bayh–Dole, see Mowery, Nelson, Sampat, and Ziedonis (2004) and Link (2006). Such 
transfer activities have been welcomed by universities as a potential source of revenue, as a 
vehicle to build relationships with external stakeholders, and as a means to enhance regional 
economic growth and development. A concomitant trend has been a burgeoning literature on the 
economics, managerial, and policy implications of such university technology transfers. 
 
As Link and Siegel (2007) have argued, scholars who assess university technology transfer have 
examined institutions that have emerged to facilitate entrepreneurial commercialization, such as 
university technology transfer offices (TTOs), industry-university cooperative research centers, 
research/science parks, and incubators (Phan, Siegel, & Wright, 2005). However, certain 
research questions are better addressed by focusing directly on agents involved in technology 
commercialization, such as academic scientists and engineers (Vanaelst et al., 2006). 
 
A smaller, yet equally important, literature has also emerged that focuses on the individual-level 
behavior relating to technology transfer mechanisms. Specifically, as reviewed in Link, Siegel, 
and Bozeman (forthcoming a), several authors have examined the determinants and outcomes of 
faculty involvement in university technology transfer, such as their propensity to disclose 
inventions and establish university-based spin-offs. 
 
Conspicuously absent from the institution and agent technology transfer literature is a systematic 
and broad-based analysis of the entrepreneurial activity of faculty as measured by their 
propensity to patent (Link & Siegel, 2007). This paper is an initial descriptive attempt to fill that 
void. The human capital dimensions of faculty are captured by their tenure status and age. As 
discussed below, drawing on aspects of human capital theory as related to innovative activity, 
these dimensions are positively related to the propensity of faculty to patent with industry. They 
are indicators of academic accomplishment and experience, both of which signal to industry 
research ability that is transferable to intellectual pursuits. 
 
 
The Individual Contexts of University Technology Transfer 
Several studies have focused on individual scientists and entrepreneurs in the context of 
university technology transfer, but few have examined the influence of human capital on the 
propensity to patent (Link & Siegel, 2007). We review below aspects of that focused literature, 
and this review motivates our subsequent hypotheses and empirical analysis. But, because 
patenting activity at universities is related to university spin-offs (Shane, 2004; Wright, Birley, & 
Mosey, 2004), selected key papers that emphasize star scientists or university researchers are 
also overviewed. 
 
Audretsch (2000) examined the extent to which entrepreneurs at universities are different than 
other entrepreneurs. He analyzed a dataset on university life scientists in order to estimate the 
determinants of the probability that they will establish a new biotechnology firm, and he found 
that university entrepreneurs tend to be older and more scientifically experienced. Audretsch 
offered no explanation for this finding, although it is consistent with our theory (below) that age 
approximated the absorptive capacity of faculty. 
 
Whittington and Smith-Doerr (2005) examined gender differences in the patenting productivity 
of academic scientists. They studied a sample of life science PhDs who had been involved in a 
university research program that had received a National Institute of General Medical Sciences 
research service award, and these scientists were matched to the National Bureau of Economic 
Research Patent Citation Date File. Their analysis suggests that academic females patent less 
than males but that the commercial value of their patents, measured in terms of citations, is equal 
to or greater than males. 
 
Wright, Vohora, and Lockett (2004) examine, through case studies of U.K. university spinout 
formations, the efficacy of joint venture spinout (JVSO) companies. A JVSO is a new venture in 
which technology is assigned or licensed into a new company that is jointly owned by the 
university and the industrial partner (p. 307). 
 
. . .  JVSOs may provide a faster, more flexible, less risky and less costly business 
venturing route to commercializing university intellectual property in comparison to 
venture backed university start-ups. 
 
In a sense, faculty patenting activity with industry is a form of a joint venture research 
relationship, and one that may be more efficient than sole academic patenting or sole industry 
patenting. This is not a point tested empirically in this paper, but rather a topic for future study. 
More broadly, Zucker and Darby, and their various collaborators, explored the role of star 
scientists in the life sciences on the creation and location of new biotechnology firms in the 
United States and Japan. Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong (2000) assessed the impact of these 
university scientists on the research productivity of U.S. firms. A star scientist is defined as a 
researcher who has discovered over 40 genetic sequences, and affiliations with firms are defined 
through co-authoring between the star scientist and industry scientists. Some of these scientists 
resigned from the university to establish a new firm or kept their faculty position, but worked 
very closely with industry scientists. Research productivity is measured using three proxies: (1) 
number of patents granted, (2) number of products in development, and (3) number of products 
on the market. They found that ties between star scientists and firm scientists have a positive 
effect on these three dimensions of research productivity, as well as other aspects of firm 
performance and rates of entry in the U.S. biotechnology industry (Zucker, Darby, & Armstrong, 
1998; Zucker, Darby, & Brewer 1998). 
 
Zucker and Darby (2001) also examined detailed data on the outcomes of collaborations between 
star university scientists and biotechnology firms in Japan. Similar patterns emerged in the sense 
that they found that such interactions substantially enhanced the research productivity of 
Japanese firms, as measured by the rate of firm patenting, product innovation, and market 
introductions of new products. However, they also reported an absence of geographically 
localized knowledge spillovers resulting from university technology transfer in Japan, in contrast 
to the United States, where they found that such effects were strong. The authors attributed this 
result to the following interesting institutional difference between Japan and the United States in 
university technology transfer. In the United States, it is common for academic scientists to work 
with firm scientists at the firm's laboratories; in Japan, firm scientists typically work in the 
academic scientist's laboratory. Thus, according to the authors, it is not surprising that the local 
economic development impact of university technology transfer appears to be lower in Japan 
than in the United States. 
 
The unit of analysis in Bercovitz and Feldman (2004) was also the individual faculty member. 
They analyzed the propensity of U.S. medical school researchers at Duke University and Johns 
Hopkins University to file invention disclosures, a potential precursor to technology 
commercialization. The authors found that three factors influence the decision to disclose 
inventions: norms at the institutions where the researchers were trained and the disclosure 
behaviors of their department chairs and peers, respectively. These authors ignored human 
capital measures and only emphasized institutional effects. 
 
Roberts and Malone (1996) also ignored human capital effects. Based on an in-depth case study 
of Stanford University in the early 1990s, they conjectured that much of the entrepreneurial 
activity that was stimulated through technology transfer was a direct result of university policies. 
They noted that during this period, Stanford refused to grant exclusive licenses to inventor-
founders. Relatedly, DiGregorio and Shane (2003) directly assessed the determinants of startup 
formation using the Association of University Technology Managers' data. They concluded that 
the two key determinants of start-ups are faculty quality and the ability of the university and 
inventor(s) to assume equity in a start-up in lieu of licensing royalty fees. 
 
Louis, Blumenthal, Gluck, and Stoto (1989) analyzed the propensity of life-science faculty to 
engage in various aspects of technology transfer, including commercialization. Their statistical 
sample consisted of life scientists at the 50 U.S. research universities that received the most 
funding from the U.S. National Institutes of Health. The authors found that the most important 
determinant of involvement in technology commercialization was local group norms; they 
reported that university policies and various types of organizational structures had little effect on 
this activity. 
 
In a similar vein, Nicolaou and Birley (2003) investigated the consequences of considering the 
social networks of academic entrepreneurs as a determinant of spinout types. Similar to Mustar 
et al. (2006), they adopted a structural contingency view of spinout types and sought to describe 
the various forms with reference to the social network structure of the academic entrepreneurs 
involved in the spinouts. Academics with strong ties to the external environment that are non-
redundant were found to be more likely to engage in spinouts. 
 
To the extent that the successful commercialization of university-based technology depends on 
the individual incentives, risk taking propensities, and skill sets of academic entrepreneurs, the 
extant research seems to suggest that paying attention to the individual level of analysis matters 
in building more complete understanding of technology transfer effectiveness. 
 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
The theoretical motivation for our hypotheses comes from several veins of research in the extant 
literature on entrepreneurship. First, we motivate patenting activity as an entrepreneurial activity 
by drawing on the writings of Schumpeter.1 
 
University faculty are engaged in basic research and basic research can lead to inventions that, 
according to Bayh–Dole, are to be disclosed through their university's TTO. However, inventions 
can go out the back door and skirt the TTO process, as documented by Markman, Gianodis, and 
Phan (2006) and by Link et al. (forthcoming a), or they can be patented with an industry partner. 
 
Schumpeter described entrepreneurial innovation in several ways. Initially he spelled out the 
kinds of new combinations that underlie economic development. They encompass the following: 
(1) creation of a new good or new quality of good; (2) creation of a new method of production; 
(3) the opening of a new market; (4) the capture of a new source of supply; and (5) a new 
organization of industry (e.g., creation or destruction of a monopoly). Schumpeter (1939) also 
envisioned such entrepreneurial innovation in terms of a production function. The production 
function, he said (p. 62): 
 
. . .  describes the way in which quantity of product varies if quantities of factors vary. If, 
instead of quantities of factors, we vary the form of the function, we have an innovation. 
 
Mere cost-reducing adaptations of knowledge lead only to new supply schedules of existing 
goods; however, this kind of innovation must involve a new commodity, or one of higher quality. 
Faculty-with-industry scientists patenting is, in a sense, a variation of the innovation production 
function and one that illustrates a response to the perception of an entrepreneurial opportunity. 
 
Our analysis focuses on three human capital variables that we hypothesize explain faculty 
involvement with industry in patenting activity. These variables are the tenure status of the 
faculty member, his/her age, and his/her gender. 
 
Tenure is a dimension of institutional human capital. It proxies what we call the “accumulated 
advantage” of faculty, meaning that tenured faculty are at the top research universities because of 
their demonstrated research ability. Faculty in general are involved in basic research, and those 
who have been awarded tenure, especially at major research universities, may be viewed by 
industry as those who could enhance the human capital of their research team. As recently 
expressed by the National Science Board (forthcoming):2 
 
. . .  a company that is involved in basic research could boost [its internal] human capital 
by attracting academically motivated and experienced scientists and engineers to 
strengthen its [internal] scientific and technological knowledge base. 
 
Thus, it follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Tenured faculty are more likely to patent with industry than non-tenured 
faculty. 
 
Following Cohen and Levinthal (1989), age is another dimension of human capital that proxies a 
faculty member's absorptive capacity, and the greater that absorptive capacity the more valuable 
a faculty member may be to industry in research processes. 
 
Relatedly, Hall, Link, and Scott (2003, p. 491) concluded from their analysis of university-with-
industry joint research activities that university faculty: 
 
. . . are included (invited by industry) in those research projects [where they] could 
provide research insight that is anticipatory of future research problems and [where they 
could] be an ombudsman anticipating and communicating to all parties the complexity of 
the research undertaken. Thus, one finds [university faculty] purposively involved in 
projects that are characterized as problematic with regard to the use of basic knowledge. 
 
Research insight, we conjecture, comes with academic experience as proxied by age. Of course, 
tenure and age are not necessarily independent characteristics of faculty. Many faculty gain an 
accumulated advantage in research with age, absent tenure, and research insights may be gained 
over time thus leading to tenure. As with any dimension of human capital, there are diminishing 
returns. Thus, the effect of age on the propensity to patent with industry will eventually decrease. 
And, to the extent that age approximates university experience, the same arguments will hold. 
This argument motivates Hypotheses 2 and 3. However, it is an empirical issue as to the age or 
experience level of faculty at which diminishing returns set in. 
Thus: 
Hypothesis 2: Older faculty are more likely to patent with industry than younger faculty, 
to a point and then the impact of age will decrease. 
Hypothesis 3: More experienced faculty are more likely to patent with industry than less 
experienced faculty, to a point and then the impact of experience will decrease. 
Finally, the impact of gender on the propensity to patent is primarily an empirical issue. The 
extant literature on gender is in its infancy. Motivating Hypothesis 4 are the sole empirical 
findings of Whittington and Smith-Doerr (2005), as reviewed above. Because female academics 
are less involved per se in the patenting process than male faculty, they are also less likely to 
partner with industry in that entrepreneurial activity. 
Thus, with this limitation in mind, we offer the following: 
Hypothesis 4: Male faculty are more likely to patent with industry than female faculty.  
Research Methodology 
Our empirical model of faculty patenting, Patent, is: 
Patent = f(Tenure, Age, Gender, X) 
Where vector X represents other demographic control characteristics of faculty such as race, 
marital status, field of research, and academic institution. We offer no hypotheses about the 
effect of these control characteristics on the propensity of faculty to patent. 
 
Our data on faculty involvement in patenting are derived from the National Science 
Foundation/Department of Energy Survey of Academic Researchers constructed under the 
sponsorship of these agencies within the Research Value Mapping Program Survey of Academic 
Researchers. Survey data were collected from a sample of university scientists and engineers 
with a PhD at the 150 Carnegie Extensive Doctoral/Research Universities during the time period 
spring 2004 to spring 2005. The sample of researchers selected to receive the survey was not 
random but rather proportional to the number of academic researchers in the various fields of 
science and engineering, and it was balanced between randomly selected men and women. 
 
The target sample was 200 men and 200 women from each of the 12 National Science 
Foundation science and technology disciplines: Biology, Computer Science, Mathematics, 
Physics, Earth and Atmospheric Science, Chemistry, Agriculture, Chemical Engineering, Civil 
Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, and Materials Engineering. 
Sampling proportions by gender and field are taken into account in the weighted regressions 
discussed below. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, this study represents the first systematic collection of such 
information from a large cross section of U.S. university scientists and engineers. 
 
Our focus from this dataset is on the propensity of faculty to patent based on faculty responses to 
the statement: During the past twelve months, I have worked directly with industry personnel in 
work that resulted in a patent or copyright. An affirmative response to this statement reflects a 
unique dimension of faculty entrepreneurship, namely collaborative activity that results in joint 
intellectual property, and it defines the dichotomous nature of our dependent variable, Patent. 
While there are clearly other dimensions of academic entrepreneurship, as discussed by Shane 
(2004) and Link and Siegel (forthcoming a), patenting is the only dimension included in our 
dataset. 
 
 
Analysis and Results 
We constructed sampling weights so that the analyzed sample is representative of the population 
of PhD academic scientists and engineers. We also limited the sample to professors aged 65 and 
younger. Thus, all of the analyzes presented and discussed below are based on weighted data; 
our conclusions therefore relate to the population of academic scientists and engineers aged 65 
and younger at the 150 top research universities in the United States.3 
 
Based on weighted data, 6.3% of our sample of 1,335 faculty engage in patent activity. Table 1 
shows that faculty who patent are more likely to be tenured and more likely to be full professors. 
They are more likely to be male, white or Asian, and much more likely to be a U.S. citizen. The 
predominant disciplines for patenting activity are electrical and mechanical engineering. Of the 
78 faculty engaged with industry in patenting activity, 92% were male, 82% were white, and 
85% were tenured. 
  
Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics from Weighted Sample† 
Variable Complete sample Patents No patents 
 
Patent .063 1.000 .000 
Tenure .747 .848 .740 
Assistant .232 .158 .237 
Associate .260 .172 .265 
Full .509 .670 .498 
Male .862 .921 .858 
Age 48.6 (9.2) 49.4 (7.4) 48.6 (9.3) 
PhD experience 19.5 (9.8) 19.8 (8.4) 19.4 (9.8) 
White .797 .820 .795 
Asian .140 .169 .138 
Black or other .068 .011 .072 
Citizen .858 .982 .849 
Married .901 .926 .899 
Number of children 1.072 (1.261) 1.181 (1.119) 1.065 (1.269) 
Agriculture .039 .050 .038 
Biology .142 .042 .149 
Computer Science .104 .120 .103 
Physics .137 .080 .141 
Earth Science .080 .005 .085 
Variable Complete sample Patents No patents 
Chemistry .132 .097 .135 
Chemical Engineering .086 .102 .042 
Civil Engineering .107 .064 .087 
Electrical Engineering .096 .226 .099 
Mechanical Engineering .031 .143 .092 
Material Engineering .063 .071 .029 
Observations 1,335 78 1,257 
 †  Mean (Standard deviation) 
Note: Data are limited to professors aged 65 and younger from the Survey of Academic 
Researchers and are weighted to represent the academic scientists and engineers at the 150 top 
research universities in the United States. 
Table 2 reports the correlation coefficients among a selected group of variables. Having tenure, 
being a full professor, being white, a U.S. citizen, older, or having more experience are all 
associated with more patent activity. Being an associate professor has a negative correlation with 
patent activity. In our later regression results, we will show that the effects of tenure and 
promotion are quite different. Tenure is positively associated with patent activity, while being 
promoted, especially to just associate professor, is negatively related to patent activity, once we 
account for tenure. 
Table 2.  Correlation Matrix of Weighted Variables (n = 1,335) 
  Patent Tenure 
Associate 
professor 
Full 
professor 
Male Age 
PhD 
experience 
White Citizen 
 
Patent 1.000                 
Tenure .056 1.000               
Associate −.049 .302 1.000             
  Patent Tenure 
Associate 
professor 
Full 
professor 
Male Age 
PhD 
experience 
White Citizen 
Full .086 .549 −.545 1.000           
Male .056 .157 −.055 .197 1.000         
Age .040 .561 −.078 .604 .271 1.000       
PhD 
experience 
.040 .597 −.120 .667 .311 .914 1.000     
White .023 .111 .006 .091 −.088 .133 .139 1.000   
Citizen .057 .258 .057 .180 .025 .261 .248 0.213 1.000 
 Note: Data are limited to professors aged 65 and younger from the Survey of Academic 
Researchers and are weighted to represent the academic scientists and engineers at the 150 top 
research universities in the United States. 
Table 3 presents propensities for patent activity by rank and tenure. The first item to note is that 
we have 14 tenured assistant professors, 32 untenured associate professors, and 10 untenured full 
professors; these cases will allow us to separate the effects of rank and tenure. Table 3 previews 
our later regression results by showing that at all ranks, tenured professors are much more likely 
to patent than untenured professors (8.1 to 4.1% for assistant professors, 4.4 to 1.5% for 
associate professors, and 8.4 to 0.0% for full professors). 
Table 3.  Patent Activity by Rank and Tenure† 
Rank Tenure No tenure 
 
Assistant professor 
.081 (.076) .041 (.010) 
[n = 14] [n = 370] 
Associate professor 
.044 (.011) 0.015 (0.022) 
[n = 343] [n = 32] 
Full professor 
.084 (.011) .000 (—) 
[n = 566] [n = 10] 
 †  Mean (Standard error) 
Note: Data are limited to professors aged 65 and younger from the Survey of Academic 
Researchers and are weighted to represent the academic scientists and engineers at the 150 top 
research universities in the United States. 
Owing to the dichotomous nature of the patent variable, Patent, hierarchical variations of 
equation 1 are estimated using probit analysis, and the estimated results are in Table 4. 
Heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity are inherent in regressions using cross sectional data. 
The standard errors in Table 4 are robust, thus the first potential econometric problem has been 
account for. 
 
Table 4.  Probit Estimates of the Determinants of Patent Activity† 
Explanatory 
variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Males (6) Females 
 
Tenure .004 (.021) .031 (.021) .035 (.020) .034 (.014)* .052 (.019)** −.016 (.036) 
Associate — −.046 (.021)* −.041 (.022) −.046 (.016)** −.066 (.023)** .009 (.040) 
Full — −.017 (.033) −.002 (.034) −.031 (.031) −.064 (.051) .055 (.066) 
Male .026 (.011)* .024 (.011)* .025 (.011)* .015 (.010) — — 
Asian .014 (.028) .019 (.029) .016 (.027) −.002 (.017) −.005 (.021) .004 (.021) 
Black or other −.041 (.013)** −.041 (.012)** −.040 (.012)** −.033 (.008)** −.038 (.010)** −.018 (.013) 
Citizen .055 (.011)** .053 (.010)** .053 (.010)** .041 (.008)** .056 (.012)** −.009 (.017) 
Married .011 (.025) .010 (.024) .010 (.025) .010 (.019) .009 (.028) .010 (.011) 
Number of 
children 
−.003 (.006) −.003 (.006) −.003 (.006) −.003 (.005) −.003 (.006) −.011 (.005) 
Age .022 (.011)* .020 (.011) .029 (.014)* .027 (.011)* .041 (.017)* −.006 (.009) 
Age2/100 −.022 (.011)* −.022 (.011)* −.028 (.015) −.027 (.012)* −.040 (.018)* .006 (.009) 
PhD experience — — −.008 (.006) −.005 (.005) −.010 (.007) .009 (.004)* 
Explanatory 
variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Males (6) Females 
PhD 
experience2/100 
— — .013 (.013) .009 (.010) .018 (.014) −.022 (.010)* 
Discipline 
indicators 
No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 .0550 .0683 .0739 .1463 .1450 .1500 
Observations 1,335 1,335 1,335 1,335 538 605 
*  = significant at 5% level; 
**  = significant at 1% level 
†  Derivative (Standard error) 
Notes: Data are limited to professors aged 65 and younger from the Survey of Academic 
Researchers and are weighted to represent the academic scientists and engineers at the 150 top 
research universities in the United States. Derivatives (or discrete changes for continuous 
variables) are evaluated at the mean. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust. 
With regard to multicollinearity, the estimated coefficients remain unbiased and the standard 
errors are higher, thus making statistical tests more difficult. We did calculate variance inflation 
factors (VIFs) for all variables in all specifications and multicollinearity did not appear to be an 
issue.4 For example, in specification (3) discussed below, upon which much of the discussion of 
the results is based, the VIF on Tenure is 5.62, which would suggest that our standard error is the 
square root of 5.62 or 2.37 times larger than it would be if not for the multicollinearity. That 
would suggest that if we regressed Patent onto Tenure alone, our standard error would be 2.37 
times smaller. But, the standard error actually increases from 0.0140 to 0.0184 in a specification 
with just Tenure. The reason for this is that when the additional controls are added, the 
numerator of the standard error formula also shrinks and it shrinks faster than the denominator 
does. So we get an “inflated” standard error that is smaller than our non-inflated standard error. 
 
Specification (1) in Table 4 shows that without conditioning on academic rank, Tenure appears 
to have very little effect on patent activity. However, once academic rank controls are included 
in specification (2), tenure increases patent activity by 3.1 percentage points—a large effect 
given that only 6.3% of the sample engages in patent activity. However, this effect is not 
statistically significant in specification (2), but it will become statistically significant as more 
controls are included. Holding tenure constant, being promoted from assistant to associate 
professor decreases patent activity by a statistically significant 4.6 percentage points. Holding 
tenure constant, full professors are also less likely to patent than assistants, although this effect is 
never statistically significant.5 
 
We also find that males are 2.4 percentage points more likely to patent, and blacks and those of 
other races are 4.1 percentage points less likely to patent. Professors patent more with age until 
their late 40s, when patent activity begins to decline. Finally, U.S. citizens are 5.3 percentage 
points more likely to partner with industry and to patent. Although the data do not permit a more 
detailed analysis of the citizenship effect, it could be that U.S. firms are more comfortable in 
filing a U.S. patent with a U.S. citizen, or that non-U.S. citizens have a lesser incentive to patent 
with U.S. firms. 
 
In specification (3), we include controls for years of experience since receiving a PhD (and its 
square), and tenure and rank remain nonsignificant.6 Specification (4) includes binary variables 
for academic fields7 and this improves the fit of the model so that the tenure effect is now 
statistically significant, which supports hypothesis 1. In this specification, the effects of tenure 
would suggest that the elimination of tenure (with promotion remaining intact) would reduce 
faculty patent activity by 55%. We arrived at this value by setting Tenure equal to zero for all 
faculty in the sample and then predicting the probability of patenting for each faculty member. 
Summing these probabilities over the whole sample, we find that patent activity is reduced by 
55% 8 While more analysis needs to done to establish these effects as causal, the data certainly 
hints at a very strong positive effect of tenure on the propensity to patent. Marital status and 
number of children never have a statistically significant impact. 
 
Faculty age has a positive effect in specifications (1) through (4) and is generally statistically 
significant, and nonlinearly related to patenting although the nonlinear effect is which supports 
hypothesis 2. The age effect is stronger among males. There is almost no impact on the Tenure 
or Age coefficients from adding controls for years of PhD experience in specification (3). 
Specifications (5) and (6) split the sample by males and females,9 and hypothesis 3 is confirmed 
only with respect to females; the propensity of females to patent increases with experience to a 
point. 
 
Specifications (1) through (4) show that males are more likely to patent with industry than 
females, which supports hypothesis 4, although the estimated coefficient is not statistically 
significant in specification (4). The findings in specifications (5) and (6), when the sample is 
split by gender, suggest that the tenure and rank effects are almost entirely due to males. 
 
Tenure is negatively associated with patent activity for females. Included in other specifications 
(not shown) are university effects. The sample size is reduced in these specifications by 28 
universities or by 336 observations because none of the faculty at these universities was involved 
in patenting activity. In the smaller sample, the tenure and rank effects are largely unchanged.10 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Each of our hypotheses was supported by our empirical analyzes. Tenured, older and more 
experienced male faculty are more likely to patent with industry. These findings contribute to the 
literature by being one of the first to emphasize empirically at the micro level the role of human 
capital in the faculty entrepreneurial activity of patenting. As such, our findings may provide 
some guidance and insight to university administrators on some of the more subtle implications 
of tenure and aging faculty. 
 
Tenure, meaning in the broadest sense—lifelong employment at the university—is granted to 
faculty but not without cost. As Link, Swann, and Bozeman (forthcoming b) show, faculty with 
tenure devote fewer hours to teaching and to research, two categories of activities that are 
fundamental to a university, especially research to a research university. However, our results 
show that tenure does have other effects, namely, patenting with industry. 
 
As universities, especially state universities, are being forced for fiscal reasons to rely less and 
less on state allocations, licensing revenues are and will continue to be a more important 
category of revenue. Thus, it is in the long-run financial interest of universities to encourage 
faculty to patent and to license through the university's TTO, and those with tenure are doing just 
that but not necessarily through the university TTO. But, based on our findings that being 
promoted to associate professor decreases the propensity to patent, it could be the case that 
conferring lifelong employment at any rank is a key to patentable entrepreneurial activity. 
 
Additional research on the managerial and economic impacts of tenure is certainly needed in the 
future. Such questions that might be investigated are whether the quality of faculty research and 
teaching changes with the award of lifetime employment. And, to keep to the broad theme of this 
paper, do faculty—once receiving tenure—begin to seek to supplement their salaries either 
through patenting activities or consulting activities. Should future research find that quality does 
decline and/or that extramural financial endeavors do increase with the confirmation of tenure, 
then university administrators have a host of management issues to deal with, especially if this 
occurs at research universities with a mission to expand the scope of basic research. 
 
Additional research is also needed on the impact of gender on patenting activity. While we did 
posit a hypothesis about gender, it should be emphasized that the hypothesis followed from a 
literature that is still in its infancy. Generalizations from our findings about gender effect on 
patenting, much less generalizations about gender effects on entrepreneurial activity in general, 
should be made cautiously. 
 
It is important to offer several qualifications about our analysis. First, our data do not quantify 
the quality of the patented innovations, which is related to whether it can be licensed; patents are 
not homogeneous. Second, our data do not account for whether the university TTO was involved 
in the research/patenting process, as opposed to the innovation going out the back door. Third, 
our data are not longitudinal. Future research on the propensity of academics to partner and to 
patent with industry should examine the lifecycle of such a relationship. Fourth, while our 
analysis did control for field and university effects, no specific institutional variables are 
available such as the efficiency of the university TTO or the university or departmental incentive 
structure as related to patenting activity. Thus, we could not control for the size or expertise or 
the TTO. As Lockett and Wright (2005) have shown using U.K. university data, spin-offs are 
more likely to occur when the TTO staff is available and experienced. With regard to our 
findings, it could be that faculty choose to patent with industry in the absence of these 
institutional conditions. And fifth, an important dimension of patenting that we could not 
examine is the interrelationship between patenting and academic research. A relevant question 
that needs to be examined is what happens to the quantity and quality of a faculty members' 
academic research once he/she begins to patent with industry? Another relevant question—and 
this question follows from Wright et al.'s (2004) analysis of joint venture spin-out companies and 
from Hall et al.'s (2003) of university faculty as partners in research joint ventures—are faculty 
patents with industry more valuable, in a citation or licensing sense, than patents from academics 
alone or than patents from industry alone owing to the value added from both parties? Caveats 
aside, our analysis is a first step to a micro-level understanding of this aspect of faculty behavior 
and one that will hopefully generate future research on this topic. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Audretsch, D.B. (2000). Is university entrepreneurship different? Mimeograph, Indiana 
University 
Bercovitz, J. & Feldman, M.P. (2004). Academic entrepreneurs: Social learning and participation 
in university technology transfer. Mimeograph, University of Toronto. 
Cohen, W.M. & Levinthal, D. (1989). Innovation and learning: The two faces of R&D. 
Economic Journal, 99, 569–596. 
DiGregorio, D. & Shane, S. (2003). Why do some universities generate more start-ups than 
others? Research Policy, 32(2), 209–227. 
Hall, B.H., Link, A.N., & Scott, J.T. (2003). Universities as research partners. Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 85(2), 485–491. 
Hébert, R.F. & Link, A.N. (2006a). The entrepreneur as innovator. Journal of Technology 
Transfer, 31(5), 589–597. 
Hébert, R.F. & Link, A.N. (2006b). Historical perspectives on the entrepreneur. Foundations and 
Trends in Entrepreneurship, 2(4), 261–408. 
Link, A.N. (2006). Public/private partnerships: Innovation strategies and public policy 
alternatives. New York: Springer. 
Link, A.N. & Siegel, D.S. (2007). Innovation, entrepreneurship, and technological change. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Link, A.N., Siegel, D.S., & Bozeman, B. (forthcoming a). An empirical analysis of the 
propensity of academics to engage in informal university technology transfer. Industrial and 
Corporate Change. 
Link, A.N., Swann, C.A., & Bozeman, B. (forthcoming b). A time allocation study of university 
faculty. Economics of Education Review. 
Lockett, A. & Wright, M. (2005). Resources, capabilities, risk, capital and the creation of 
university spin-out companies. Research Policy, 34(7), 1043–1057. 
Louis, K.S., Blumenthal, D., Gluck, M.E., & Stoto, M.A. (1989). Entrepreneurs in academe: An 
exploration of behaviors among life scientists. Administrative Science Quarterly, 34(1), 110–
131. 
Markman, G.D., Gianodis, P.T., & Phan P. (2006). Sidestepping the ivory tower: Rent 
appropriations through bypassing of U.S. universities. Mimeograph, University of Georgia. 
Mowery, D.C., Nelson, R.R., Sampat, B.N., & Ziedonis, A.A. (2004). Ivory tower and industrial 
innovation: University-industry technology transfer before and after the Bayh–Dole Act. Palo 
Alto: Stanford University Press. 
Mustar, P., Renault, M., Colombo, M.G., Piva, E., Fontes, M., Lockett, A., et al (2006). 
Conceptualising the heterogeneity of research-based spin-offs: A multi-dimensional taxonomy. 
Research Policy, 35(2), 289–303. 
National Science Board. (forthcoming). 2008 Science and engineering indicators. Arlington, VA: 
National Science Foundation. 
Nicolaou, N. & Birley, S. (2003). Academic networks in a trichotomous categorisation of 
university spinouts. Journal of Business Venturing, 18(3), 333–359. 
Phan, P.H., Siegel, D.S., & Wright, M. (2005). Science parks and incubators: Observations, 
synthesis and future research. Journal of Business Venturing, 20(2), 165–182. 
Roberts, E. & Malone, D.E. (1996). Policies and structures for spinning off new companies from 
research and development organizations. R&D Management, 26(1), 17–48. 
Schumpeter, J.A. (1939). Business cycles. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Shane, S. (2003). A general theory of entrepreneurship: The individual–opportunity nexus. 
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Shane, S. (2004). Academic entrepreneurship: University spinoffs and wealth creation. 
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Stevens, A.J. (2004). The enactment of Bayh–Dole. Journal of Technology Transfer, 29(1), 93–
99. 
Vanaelst, I., Clarysse, B., Wright, M., Lockett, A., Moray, N., & S'Jegers, R. (2006). 
Entrepreneurial team development in academic spinouts: An examination of team heterogeneity. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 30(2), 249–271. 
Whittington, K. & Smith-Doerr, L. (2005). Gender and commercial science: Women's patenting 
in the life sciences. Journal of Technology Transfer, 30(4), 355–370. 
Wright, M., Birley, S., & Mosey, S. (2004). Entrepreneurship and university technology transfer. 
Journal of Technology Transfer, 29(3–4), 235–246. 
Wright, M., Vohora, A., & Lockett, A. (2004). The formation of high-tech university spinouts: 
The role of joint ventures and venture capital investors. Journal of Technology Transfer, 29(3–4), 
287–310. 
Zucker, L.G. & Darby, M.R. (2001). Capturing technological opportunity via Japan's star 
scientists: Evidence from Japanese firms' biotech patents and products. Journal of Technology 
Transfer, 26(1–2), 37–58. 
Zucker, L.G., Darby, M.R., & Armstrong, J.S. (1998). Geographically localized knowledge: 
Spillovers or markets? Economic Inquiry, 36(1), 65–86. 
Zucker, L.G., Darby, M.R., & Armstrong, J.S. (2000). University science, venture capital, and 
the performance of U.S. biotechnology firms. Mimeograph, UCLA. 
Zucker, L.G., Darby, M.R., & Brewer, M.B. (1998). Intellectual human capital and the birth of 
U.S. biotechnology enterprises. American Economic Review, 88(1), 290–306. 
 
The data examined in this paper were collected under grants from the Department of Energy and 
the National Science Foundation as part of the project “Assessing Economic and Social Impacts 
of Basic Research Sponsored by the Office of Basic Energy Sciences,” under contract DE-FG02-
96ER45562 and “Assessing R&D Projects' Impacts on Scientific and Technical Human Capital 
Development” (SBR 98-18229). The opinions expressed in the paper are the authors' and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation or the Department of Energy. 
These data were graciously provided by Barry Bozeman. 
 
Footnotes 
1 For a more complete discussion of the Schumpeterian view of innovation and entrepreneurial 
activity, see Hébert and Link (2006a, 2006b) and Shane (2003). 
2 This quotation is taken from p. 23 of the April 4, 2007 draft of Chapter 4 of 2008 Science and 
Engineering Indicators. 
3 Detailed information on the sampling weights is available from the authors on request. Math 
professors (n = 91) were deleted, because none were involved with industry in patent activity; 
thus, that variable predicted perfectly in the later probit regressions. 
4 These results are available from the authors on request. 
5 As one referee noted, the negative effect of promotion may indicate that promotion is based on 
basic research output, such as journal publications, and faculty who excel in that dimension may 
be less likely to enter into the more applied areas, which lead to patents. 
6 Alternatively, we defined experience as year with tenure. When so measured, the estimated 
coefficient was not significant. These results are available from the authors on request. 
7 See Table 1 for the included academic fields. 
8 The 95% confidence interval for this effect ranges from a 5% to 76% reduction in patent 
activity, based on calculations assuming a tenure effect equal to the estimated Tenure coefficient 
plus or minus 1.96 times its standard error. 
9 When the sample is split by gender, the sample size is smaller because some disciplines 
perfectly predict patent activity. 
10 These results are available from the authors on request. The estimated coefficients for UCLA 
and the University of Arizona were positive and significant; the estimated coefficients were 
negative and significant for Virginia Tech, the University of Texas, Iowa State, and Clemson. 
